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Editorial note
This article reflects part of Dr Twycross’ lecture Death without suffering? given in October 2008 at the 2nd
Congress of the Polish Association for Palliative Medicine. Much of the content will also be included in
Symptom Management in Advanced Cancer 4th edition 2009, co-authored with Andrew Wilcock and Claire
Stark Toller, whose contributions are gratefully acknowledged.
The article supplements those published in this journal (vol. 7, no. 3) on the need for a balanced approach in
relation to the issue of sustaining life versus allowing death, and the need to avoid overzealous life-sustaining
treatment in those with end-stage disease. The article has added value in that it is contributed by someone
whose medical career, spanning some 40 years, was spent almost entirely in palliative care.
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Introduction
Society’s commission to healthcare profession-
als is succinctly summarized in the aphorism “to
cure sometimes, to relieve often, to comfort al-
ways”. The same mandate applies in palliative care,
even though the possibility of cure is limited to
intercurrent events or complications such as infec-
tion. Given that the primary disease is incurable,
the emphasis shifts decisively to relief and to com-
fort in end-stage disease.
Medical ethics and palliative care
Because there is an imbalance of power in the
relationship between a professional and a client,
professional behaviour is governed by ethical codes
of practice. In this way, it is hoped that abuses of
professional power can be avoided. In medical care,
the same cardinal principles apply ”across the
board”, from obstetrics to geriatrics, and from acute
care to palliative care, namely:
— respect for patient autonomy (patient choice);
— beneficence (do good);
— non-maleficence (minimize harm);
— justice (fair use of available resources) [1].
These four principles are applied against the
background of respect for life and an acceptance of
the ultimate inevitability of death [2]. Thus in prac-
tice, there are three dichotomies which need to be
held in balance:
— the potential benefits of treatment versus the
potential risks and burdens;
— striving to preserve life but, when the burdens
of life-sustaining treatments outweigh the po-
tential benefits, withdrawing or withholding
such treatments and ensuring comfort in dy-
ing;
— individual needs versus the needs of society.
There is also need for a sense of urgency, both in
acute care and in palliative care. Thus the Emanci-
pation Principle of palliative care:
No efforts should be spared to free dying per-
sons from unbearable suffering which invades and
dominates their consciousness, and leaves no space
for other things [3].
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Patient autonomy
Doctors often act as if patients have an obliga-
tion to accept medically recommended treatment.
However, legally a person is not obliged to accept
medical treatment, even if refusal may result in an
earlier death [4, 5]. Doctors thus have an obligation
to discuss treatment options and their implications
with patients, and to obtain their informed consent
before proceeding with treatment.
Without consent, a doctor risks being found lia-
ble in battery [6]. If a patient lacks capacity to give
or withhold consent, a doctor’s legal obligation is
to treat in what he perceives as the patient’s best
interests [7]. Severe depression, delirium (acute con-
fusional state) or dementia are common causes of
lack of capacity to give consent.
Principle of double effect
The principle of double effect has been described
in various ways [8–11]. In essence the principle states
that:
A single act having two possible foreseen ef-
fects, one good and one harmful, is not always mor-
ally prohibited if the harmful effect is not intended
and there is no other way of achieving the same
result.
The principle is generally ascribed to Thomas
Aquinas, the 13th century theologian and philoso-
pher [12]. It was originally enunciated in relation to
self-defence. If I defend myself when attacked and
my attacker is severely injured or killed, I can invoke
this principle in my defence against a charge of
grievous bodily harm or homicide. The principle of
double effect is thus a universal principle which is
invoked to exculpate someone when a good action
results in unintended harm. The practice of medi-
cine would be impossible without such a principle.
It is essential because all treatment has an inherent
risk and, inevitably, things sometimes go wrong.
Discussion of the principle of double effect often
focuses on the use of morphine or similar drugs to
relieve pain in terminally ill patients. This gives the
false impression that the use of morphine in this cir-
cumstance is a high-risk strategy [13]. When correctly
used, morphine (and other strong opioids) are very
safe drugs, almost certainly safer than non-steroidal
anti-inflammatory drugs. The use of both classes of
analgesic is justified on the basis that the benefits of
pain relief far outweigh the risk of serious undesirable
effects. Indeed, clinical experience suggests that those
whose pain is relieved live longer than would have
been the case if they had continued to be exhausted
and demoralized by severe unremitting pain.
However, the intended aim of treatment must
always be the relief of suffering and not the pa-
tient’s death. Although a greater risk is acceptable
in more extreme circumstances, it remains axiom-
atic that effective measures which carry less risk to
life or of harm should normally be used. Thus, in
an extreme situation, although it may be ethically
acceptable to heavily sedate a patient with drugs
into unconsciousness (because less extreme mea-
sures have failed to bring relief), it is still generally
considered unacceptable to precipitate death de-
liberately by administering a lethal injection (eu-
thanasia).
Appropriate treatment
However, to achieve an appropriate balance be-
tween “fighting for life” and “allowing peaceful
death”, doctors must constantly keep in mind the
undeniable fact that, ultimately, all patients must
die. Thus, part of the skill of medicine is to decide
when to allow death to occur without further im-
pediment. A doctor is not obliged legally or ethical-
ly to preserve life “at all costs” [14]. Priorities change
when a patient is clearly dying. There is no obliga-
tion to employ treatments if their use can best be
described as prolonging the process of dying [15,
16]. A doctor has neither a duty nor the right to
prescribe a lingering death. In palliative care, the
primary aim of treatment is not to prolong life but
to make the life which remains as comfortable and
as meaningful as possible.
Further, because there is an ethical imperative
incumbent upon health professionals collectively
to ensure continuity of care, it should never be a
question of to treat or not to treat. Rather, the
question should be reformulated in terms of what
is the most appropriate treatment given the pa-
tient’s biological prospects and his personal and
social circumstances? Appropriate treatment for
an acutely ill patient may be inappropriate in the
dying (Figure 1 and Figure 2). Nasogastric tubes,
IV infusions, antibiotics, cardiac resuscitation, and
assisted ventilation (and many other medical in-
terventions) were all introduced into medical prac-
tice primarily as support measures for use in acute
or acute-on-chronic illnesses to assist a patient
through the initial crisis towards recovery of health.
The use of these measures in patients who are
irreversibly close to death is generally inappropri-
ate, and therefore bad practice; the overall bur-
dens (personal, social, financial) of such treatments
exceed their potential benefits, and they are (or
become) increasingly futile.
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Thus, therapeutic recommendations are based
on a consideration of the possible advantages (ben-
efits) and disadvantages (risks and burdens) which
might accrue for the patient. A doctor is not a tech-
nician and, in practice, there are generally several
courses of action which might legitimately be adopt-
ed. Arguments in favour of a certain treatment re-
volve around the question of the anticipated effec-
tiveness of intervention. Linked with this are con-
siderations of the consequences and implications
for the patient, the family and society as a whole. In
other words, the doctor seeks, on the basis of the
biological and social facts at his disposal, to offer
the patient the most appropriate form of care, heavi-
ly influenced by what is perceived to be the pa-
tient’s likely prognosis. Because death is inevitable
for everyone, doctors ultimately have no choice but
to “let nature take its course”.
Medical care is a continuum, ranging from com-
plete cure at one end to symptom relief at the oth-
er. Many types of treatment span the entire spec-
trum, notably radiotherapy and, to a lesser extent,
chemotherapy and surgery. It is important to keep
the therapeutic aim clearly in mind when employ-
ing any from of treatment. In deciding what is ap-
propriate, the key points to bear in mind are:
— the patient’s biological prospects;
— the therapeutic aim and benefits of each treat-
ment;
— the undesirable (adverse) effects of treatment;
— the need not to prescribe a lingering death.
Although the possibility of unexpected improve-
ment or recovery should not be totally ignored, there
are many occasions when it is appropriate to “give
death a chance”. Further, as death draws near, in-
terest in hydration and nutrition often becomes min-
imal, and it is inappropriate to force someone to
accept food and fluid. The patient’s disinterest or
positive disinclination is part of the process of let-
ting go.
Case history
A 96-year-old woman with advanced Alzheimer’s
dementia was admitted to hospital because of sus-
pected pneumonia. She had been bed-bound for 2
years, and had several decubitus ulcers. For many
months she had not been able to speak and no
longer recognized her sister (her main carer at home).
In the past she had had a feeding gastrostomy in-
serted. She was treated vigorously with IV antibac-
terial and antifungal antibiotics for more than 2
weeks. Her sister then requested that the patient be
discharged to her home, and allowed to die. This
caused consternation (“an ethical crisis”) among the
doctors because, if she went home, it would not be
possible to continue IV antibiotics and hydration.
This case history illustrates the fact that some
doctors still practice medicine on the blinkered ba-
sis of delaying death “at all costs”. The woman was
being treated with very expensive antibiotics, cost-
ing several hundred euros per day. But to what pur-
pose? It seems that the doctors had failed to think
through the implications of dementia as an incur-
able progressive disease. The inappropriate treat-
ment probably began some 2 years earlier when
the patient could no longer feed herself, and no
Figure 1. A graphical representation of acute illness.
Biological prospects are generally good. Acute resuscita-
tive measures are important and enable the patient to
survive the initial crisis. Recovery is aided by the natural
forces of healing: rehabilitation is completed by the
patient on his own, without continued medical support
Figure 2. A graphical representation of terminal
illness. Biological prospects progressively worsen.
Acute and terminal illnesses are therefore distinct
pathophysiological entities. Therapeutic interventions
which can best be described as prolonging the distress
of dying are futile and inappropriate
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longer accepted food from her carers (and probably
actively clenched her teeth to prevent feeding). Then,
instead of accepting this as part of a natural “shut-
ting down” process typical of advanced dementia,
they had intervened with a death-prolonging feed-
ing gastrostomy*. Now, when the patient deve-
loped an aspiration pneumonia, instead of seeing
this as another typical end-point in dementia, inap-
propriate and extravagantly costly measures were
initiated. But, to what purpose?
I suggest that such interventions are best de-
scribed as “mindless” or “meddlesome” medicine
— treatment to be regarded as prolonging the pro-
cess of dying rather than sustaining meaningful life.
Unfortunately, the doctors involved had not fully
integrated into their clinical practice the fact that
ultimately all human beings must die. As a result,
death is allowed only after weeks of intensive (and
very expensive) acute care. Yes, they were present-
ed with an “ethical crisis” — but it was one of their
own making. It would have been much better if,
long before this final admission, they had accepted
reality, offered palliative (comfort) care pro-active-
ly, and allowed natural death to proceed without
further medical impediment.
Ordinary vs. extraordinary means
The concept of ordinary and extraordinary mea-
sures was first formalized in the 16th Century [17].
Ordinary measures are traditionally described as those
which are not particularly burdensome. Thus, they:
— are financially affordable by most people in that
locality;
— do not cause excessive or prolonged suffering
for patients;
— have a good chance of success.
In contrast, extraordinary measures are those
which are burdensome, or potentially so. Thus, they:
— are expensive;
— may result in severe adverse consequences, e.g.
paralysis or a fistula;
— have only a small chance of success [18].
The concept may be useful for theologians ad-
vising people about what forms of medical treat-
ment they should feel obliged to accept but, as
demonstrated above, it is not the focus of the doc-
tor’s decision-making process. This is implicitly reco-
gnized by the increasing use of terms such as “pro-
portionate” and “disproportionate”, and of “futili-
ty”. Such terms reflect an increasing acceptance in
practice of the need to allow natural death in end-
stage disease [19]. However, as the case history
above illustrates, collectively, the medical profes-
sion still has a long way to go.
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*The author presents the problem of feeding in dementia in a controversial way. His article has provoked
lively discussion among physicians in Poland and other countries. We have asked some authorities in the field
of psychogeriatry, feeding and metabolism and palliative medicine for their comments, which we plan to
publish in the 2nd issue of Advances in 2010 (editorial footnote). Unfortunately we have not received on time
the expected comments and articles, thus the publications will be included in one of the future editions of
Advances (from editor).
